Introduction
On October 3, 1968 , the armed forces of Peru overthrew the country's president, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, launching one of the most interesting socio-economic experiments in contemporary Latin American history. Six days later, the new president of Peru, Division General Juan Velasco Alvarado, delivered a historic speech announcing the nationalization of the oil resources controlled by the International Petroleum Company (IPC). In his message, General Velasco Alvarado represented the IPC nationalization as an act of affirmation of national sovereignty. The IPC -a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company, an important and influential U.S. corporation-arrived in Peru at the beginning of the 20th century. The relations between the IPC and the Peruvian government had been tinted with controversy since long before 1968. The debate regarding the legality of IPC's exploitation rights, government claims for overdue and undervalued tax payments, and an arrogant stance -regarded as an IPC trademark among the Peruvian publicbrewed a strong nationalistic sentiment which eventually elicited Velasco Alvarado's discourse. The Belaúnde regime tried in vain to strike an agreement with IPC officials, who were supported by the U.S. government. The failure to fix matters with the IPC was one of the causes leading to the 1968 coup. In this context, it came as no surprise that one of the Peruvian generals' first moves was to nationalize IPC to reaffirm national sovereignty and pride. Their actions -and self-presentation as protectors of national sovereignty-served to legitimize the new regime. The military government thus started out with a nationalistic gesture that foreshadowed a confrontation with U.S. authorities, who had historically defended the IPC's interests.
During its most radical phase (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RGAF) implemented important policies and reforms, notably: expropriating several U.S. corporations (W.R. Grace and Cerro de Pasco, in addition to IPC); seeking to realign the Inter-American diplomatic order established by the postwar Rio de Janeiro Treaty; openly lobbying for termination of the embargo on Cuba; defending the recognition of Peru's 200-mile maritime boundary; and establishing diplomatic and trade relations with several communist bloc countries. The Peruvian government also participated actively in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), purchased hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Soviet weapons, implemented a land reform, and set in motion an aggressive economic program marked by nationalistic overtones seeking to promote Peru's development and self-sufficiency. Along these lines, the military government adopted an anti-imperialist discourse, which, together with its economic, political, and diplomatic policies, provoked an unprecedented confrontation with the U.S. government. Cynthia McClintock and Fabián T. Vallas indicate that "the military government represented a greater threat to U.S. interests than the Allende regime in Chile," considering the close relationship between the Peruvian armed forces and their Soviet counterparts.
1 While the validity of this assertion is debatable, there is no doubt that the Peruvian military government became a matter of great concern to U.S. authorities.
Even though the RGAF has attracted the attention of several Peruvian and international researchers, they have focused on the analysis of domestic socio-economic and political subjects, but less on diplomatic and international issues, in particular the interaction between the Peruvian military and the U.S. government. The few who have overcome this limitation have focused on the in shaping foreign policy by approving legislative limits on presidential powers. Unfortunately, Congress does not receive a degree of attention in the study of U.S.-Latin American relations proportional to its relevance and influence. Presidential decisions are usually prioritized in historical studies and the influence of Congress, while not totally absent, is not given due importance. 5 This problem is not exclusive to U.S.-Latin American relations. In an article published in 2000, Julian E. Zelizer, a prominent researcher of Congress, underscored the insufficient attention paid to it by historians. Zelizer stresses that, in addition to minimizing its importance and influence, historians have confined themselves to explaining the stance and policies of members of Congress in political, ideological, and/or regional terms. As a result, they have reduced members of the U.S. Congress to the status of "provincial politicians concerned exclusively with securing support from voters in their constituencies" and lost sight of the fact that their policies have also been determined by cultural, racial, ideological, and social considerations. 6 Although in a more recent work Zelizer recognizes that some progress has been made in the U.S. regarding the historic study of Congress during the last 15 years, especially through the work of Gary Stone, Robert D. Johnson, and Paul C. Milazzo, he complains that it continues to be largely uncharted territory. 7 This essay focuses on 1968-1975, widely considered to be the RGAF's most radical period. Based on an examination of the U.S. Congressional Record, I will show, first, that the conflict provoked by the 200-mile declaration -especially the seizure of U.S. fishing vessels by the Peruvian navy-rather than the IPC expropriation was the most hotly debated issue in the U.S. Congress -and the one that elicited the harshest reactions. While the IPC nationalization did indeed attract attention, the 200-mile issue was placed higher on the Congressional agenda for political reasons. Second, several Congress members used the RGAF's policies to advance their own political and ideological agendas, looking to enhance their weight and influence in the creation of U.S. foreign policy. They mainly concentrated their attacks on certain elements of U.S. foreign policy like economic aid, arms sales, and support for Latin American dictatorships and military forces.
Congress and the Cold War
Before discussing the relations between the U.S. Congress and the RGAF, it is necessary to understand the former's role in developing U.S. foreign policy during the first few decades of the Cold War. McCarran (D-Nevada), and John W. Bricker (R-Ohio). The latter formed a powerful trio that linked the idea of enhancing Congressional power with a conservative international agenda. When their power collapsed eventually, according to Johnson, the most important postwar critics of the decline of Congressional power disappeared. 8 However, in the 1960s Congress recovered its influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy. A key element in the process was the issue of economic aid, then at the center of the criticism of U.S. foreign policy. The first important U.S. economic aid program was the Marshall Plan. Created in the framework of the 1948 Economic Cooperation Act, the Marshall Plan provided European countries with financial assistance after WWII. Three years later, Congress approved the Mutual Security Act, which unified economic-military aid and technical assistance. In 1961, Congress approved the Foreign Assistance Act, which separated military from civil aid. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was created to manage economic aid programs. 9 During the first postwar years the main opponents of foreign aid were conservatives concerned with the cost of possible assistance to center-left governments. However, a bipartisan coalition of northern Democrats and moderate Republicans secured the survival of the program. . In particular, they criticized the assistance provided to dictatorships just for being anti-communist, and proposed amendments to ban economic aid to governments not elected by democratic means. The emergence of the "liberal dissidents" occurred in the context of the counter-insurgency programs and the Alliance for Progress promoted by President John F. Kennedy, which called for a considerable increase in economic and military aid. Unfortunately for Kennedy, a "foreign aid revolt" began in 1963. Under the leadership of conservative Congressman Otto E. Passman (D-Louisiana) and the "liberal dissidents," Congress blocked the economic aid package advocated by the Kennedy administration and introduced several amendments to limit the provision of assistance. According to Johnson, this congressional victory paved the way for a new era in Executive-Congress relations.
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The Vietnam War was another important factor in the renewed role of Congress in the design and debate of U.S. foreign policy. A growing Congressional dissidence criticized U.S. participation in the Indochina wars. For these Congress members, the Cold War had led the U.S. government to support dictatorships allegedly in the name of strategic interests and at the expense of traditional American ideals. In particular, they criticized U.S. reliance on military solutions to problems that were clearly political. The process resulted in a marked polarization, especially within the Senate, where issues like military aid and nuclear weapons came under considerable questioning. 12 In the early 1970s, Congressional support for the President's unilateral decisions and the assumptions on which they were based weakened considerably in connection with the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet split, skepticism about the contention policy, and the impact of the Watergate scandal. In consequence, the "internationalist" Congressmen provoked a "Congressional revolt against the anti-Communist ethos of the Cold War and executive foreign policy". 13 It is in this context of Congressional rebellion that the RGAF came to power and developed its most controversial policies. Like the "revisionists" of the initial Cold War years, the "new internationalists" eventually lost their political and ideological clout. However, they were able to institutionalize their agenda by passing legislation like the 1973 War Powers Act, which limited the President's power to send troops to control hostile situations.
Reactions to the Coup
Only two Congressmen reacted to the coup that ousted President Belaúnde. The first one was Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska), who addressed the Senate on October 3, 1968 to denounce the overthrow of Peru's democratically elected President. Gruening became a Senator in 1959 at 71, after a long liberal and anti-imperialist track record.
14 His election was part of a process of change in the composition of the Senate, which strengthened the wing favoring greater Congressional intervention in designing U.S. foreign policy. According to Johnson, Gruening was an example of the changes taking place in the Senate, as he openly pressed for a greater role of Congress in foreign policy issues. 15 Gruening interpreted the coup as an example of the failure of U.S. foreign policy. Belaúnde's ousting was not the result of domestic factors, but of the militaristic drive promoted by U.S. military aid to Latin American governments. 16 Driven by this approach, Gruening became the first of several Congressmen who used the policies implemented by the RGAF to attack and question U.S. foreign policy over the following seven years.
Senator Ralph W. Yarborough (D-Texas) also reacted to the military coup against Belaúnde, reading it as a victory of Latin American élites against a reformist democrat. Yarborough advised caution to the State Department regarding the recognition of the new Peruvian government.
coup to the IPC issue, although Yarborough introduced in the Congressional Record an article where Washington Post journalist John Goshko mentioned it. 18 In 1968-1975, the representation of the RGAF in Congress experienced an interesting evolution. During its first two years, it was described as a militaristic, fascist, nationalist government. 19 In spite of the policies it implemented, it was not accused of being a leftist government, and Senator Frank B. Morse (R-Massachusetts) actually denied it was a communist regime. 20 While in 1971 Congressman Robert L. Leggett (D-California) accused it of being a left-wing regime, the harshest representation of the RGAF came only in 1975. That year, Representative Lawrence P. McDonald (D-Georgia) launched a campaign against the RGAF, accusing it of being Marxist and pro-Soviet. 21 McDonald's objective was to counter a State Department decision to block used military equipment sales to the Chilean military regime. The Congressman reminded his colleagues that the Chilean government was an old and loyal friend of the U.S., which had obliterated the Allende Marxist threat. McDonald lashed out at the U.S. press for attacking the Chilean military government and ignoring the anti-U.S., revolutionary, Marxist, and pro-Soviet Peruvian regime. He emphasized that the Peruvian armed forces had increased their military power through purchases of Soviet weapons with a double objective: that of repressing their own people and invading Chile. McDonald criticized the U.S. government for limiting the defensive capacity of Latin America's most anti-communist and pro-U.S. regime. 22 How to explain this frontal attack against the RGAF just as its most radical phase was coming to an end? McDonald reacted to Congressional measures against the government of Augusto Pinochet. In 1974, the Nixon administration requested Congress to approve 85 million dollars in aid to Chile -of which 20 million were earmarked for military spending. Unfortunately for Pinochet, the Senate rejected the initiative due to concerns about human rights violations. In 1976, Congress approved an embargo on arms sales to Chile at the initiative of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). Termination of the embargo was conditional on Congressional certification of the end of human rights violations in Chile. 23 McDonald was reputedly one of the most furious anti-communists in Congress, hence his attacks against the Peruvian military and leftist regime to defend a regime 18 he considered foolproof anti-communist and, therefore, deserving of full U.S. support. 24 In other words, McDonald's reaction was ideologically motivated, and it provides a robust example of how some Congressmen used the RGAF to advance their personal agendas.
The IPC Expropriation
Historian Richard J. Walter points out that the Nixon administration's reaction to the RGAF was not much different from the Johnson administration's stance towards Belaúnde. The Nixon administration reacted to Velasco's expropriations by withholding economic aid and blocking loans by multilateral agencies. Like Johnson, Nixon enforced decisions while officially denying them. Despite provocations, the Nixon administration kept a restrained stance. Since 1970, the RGAF benefited from the fact that Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, focused on Salvador Allende's Chile. 25 In 1974, the U.S. and Peru reached a deal on the payment of an indemnity for the companies nationalized by the RGAF. As explained below, the U.S. Congress showed less tolerance towards the RGAF.
Congress did not react immediately to the IPC expropriation. The first Congressman to do so was Senator Clifford P. Hansen (R-Wyoming) on October 11, 1968 . He used the expropriation to justify his draft law (S. 4190) for promoting domestic production of shale oil. Hansen advocated a more aggressive policy regarding the exploitation of national energy resources. He considered it important to reduce oil imports, as they were subject to contingencies such as unilateral revisions of contracts and the expropriation of U.S. oil companies, as had just happened in Peru. 26 Hansen, a Senator from an oil state, was more concerned about advancing the interests of domestic oil producers than attacking the IPC expropriation -which he used for political purposes. 27 Hansen was not the only Congressman to react to the IPC expropriation. Two tendencies can be identified: those who adopted a hard stance and sought to force the RGAF to compensate the IPC; and those who assumed a more tolerant attitude. The latter, with some liberal dissidents among them, used the issue to criticize key elements of U.S. foreign policy, especially towards Latin America. Those who criticized the expropriation favored the application of the Hickenlooper amendment. Proposed by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), this amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 authorized the President to suspend economic aid to any country that expropriated U.S. property and did not compensate the owners within six months. Frances X. Hogan argues that it 24 McDonald was one of the victims on a Korean Airlines aircraft shot down by Soviet air defense forces in 1983.
His presence on that flight has been used to explain the Soviet decision to take military action, as it has been argued, perhaps in an exaggerated manner, that the Soviet Union wanted to eliminate its greatest enemy in Congress. was approved in response to the expropriation of properties belonging to the International Telephone Company in Brazil. 28 Its objective was to protect U.S. citizens from arbitrary expropriations. One of the Congressmen who favored the application of the Hickenlooper instrument was Senator Russell B. Long (D-Louisiana), who at the end of January 1969 proposed to eliminate Presidential discretion in the application of the amendment in order to make it mandatory. In Long's view, the IPC expropriation was an arbitrary act that exposed the vulnerability of U.S. oil companies. Like Hansen, Long used the opportunity to promote domestic oil production over oil imports. While recognizing that imported oil was cheaper, he argued that imports left the U.S. vulnerable. It goes without saying that Louisiana, Long's constituency, is an oil producer. 29 After six months, the Peruvian government had not yet paid compensation, as established by the Hickenlooper amendment; and Representative William J. Edward (R-Alabama) demanded suspension of all aid programs targeted to Peru. Edward argued that neither Peru nor other countries would cease to defy the U.S. if it did not take steps to earn their respect. Therefore, it was necessary to expedite application of the amendment, thus far postponed by the State Department. 30 Other members of Congress expressed sympathy for Peru, criticized the IPC, and questioned the need to enforce the Hickenlooper amendment. Congressmen like Thomas M. Rees (D-California), Thomas R. Pelly (R-Washington), and Richard L. Ottinger (D-Nueva York) recognized Peru's right to expropriate the IPC, but underscored the need to compensate its owners. They supported the intervention of a third party, possibly the Organization of American States (OAS) or the International Court of Justice. 31 The case of Representative Rees (D-California) is interesting, as he associated himself with Peru and severely criticized the Hickenlooper amendment. In the view of the Californian Congressman, the IPC expropriation was "perhaps the greatest crisis in U.S.-Latin American relations in our time." Rees was convinced that enforcing the amendment would further complicate relations with Peru and negatively affect relations with Latin America. He was concerned that the U.S. would become isolated in the southern hemisphere. 32 Rees adopted a tolerant and sympathetic stance towards Peru's position regarding the IPC, as he concurred with the Peruvian authorities that the expropriation was an isolated case resulting from a 45-year dispute. Over that period the IPC had been a cause of resentment among Peruvians, who considered that it had exploited 28 their national resources in an unfair and illegal manner. Hence their view of the IPC expropriation as a legal act performed in defense of their legitimate rights. Rees acknowledged that the expropriation was considered an act of reparation in Peru and General Velasco was seen as a hero, in spite of the disastrous consequences such a challenge to U.S. power could bring to Peru's economy. 33 In Reese's view, the allegedly deterrent effect of the Hickenlooper amendment had backfired. Quoting General Velasco, Reese stated that, given the history of official U.S. support for the IPC, enforcement of the Hickenlooper amendment would be seen by the Peruvian public as an act of economic pressure, and the inevitable accusations of economic imperialism would be used by communists to argue that U.S. foreign policy was designed to facilitate the exploitation of less developed countries. Reese emphasized that the U.S. should avoid a deterioration of its reputation in the hemisphere by seeking a fair solution to the problem, which would be impossible if the Hickenlooper amendment was enforced. 34 The Congressman used his discourse to acknowledge the widespread resentment in Latin America against the massive U.S. economic influence in the region. Both Peru and the other Latin American countries needed foreign capital to develop. Rees underscored the role of U.S. capital in creating jobs and introducing new technologies, but criticized its inability to persuade the Latin American public of such benefits. Along these lines, it was crucial for the U.S. to develop a sound Latin American policy aimed at treating Latin Americans "as equals and as partners" in the search for better living conditions in the western hemisphere.
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Other Congressmen also criticized the Hickenlooper amendment. In February 1969, Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY) submitted a draft amendment to the Economic Assistance Act proposing to authorize the President not to cut economic aid, as established by the amendment, if it was considered to serve the national interest. He aimed at making enforcement of the amendment more flexible to strengthen the President's negotiating capacity. 36 Rosenthal used his intervention to severely criticize the Hickenlooper amendment. In his opinion, the infamous amendment deprived the parties in dispute of the necessary time to create the conditions for an understanding and prioritized the interests and properties "of a single American company of whatever size and whatever behavior, above other considerations of national interest." 37 The amendment also ignored and confused the objectives of U.S. economic aid. Rosenthal argued that aid was not an expression of American generosity, but a way to defend U.S. interests by promoting economic stability and 33 The Congressional Record reveals that, contrary to historian Noel Maurer's perception, IPC did not muster the kind of support in Congress that it had at the Presidential level, since, according to Maurer, "Congressional anger at the expropriations was strong." 39 In fact, a close examination of Congressional sessions shows that few Congress members stood out for IPC; and those who did were more interested in advancing local political interests. Another group of Congress members adopted a tolerant stance towards the IPC expropriation, condemned the Hickenlooper amendment, used the opportunity to criticize U.S. foreign policy, and rejected putting the interests of a corporation above those of the American nation.
The Fishing Conflict
In the late 1940s, the Peruvian government took the first steps to claim national sovereignty over waters within 200 nautical miles of its coast. In 1952, Peru entered into league with Ecuador and Chile to claim exclusive sovereignty over a maritime zone within 200 miles of their coasts. Ronald Bruce St. John stresses that, in so doing, they sought to control their fishing and mineral resources. This joint move was condemned by the U.S. -which recognized a 12-mile limit-and marked the beginning of a controversy that went on for years and affected U.S.-Peru relations negatively. 40 In 1954, these three South American nations announced that they would not unilaterally withdraw their claim over the 200-mile "maritime dominion;" Moreover, they declared their intention to enforce their rights by all means necessary. A year later, two U.S. fishing vessels were seized by the Peruvian navy within the 200-mile limit claimed by Peru.
As part of its policy of reaffirming national sovereignty, the RGAF further tightened enforcement of the 200-mile limit, as a result of which the number of seizures of U.S. fishing vessels soared. 41 In February 1969, the Peruvian navy captured the U.S. tuna ship Mariner for allegedly fishing in Peruvian waters. 42 Tuna ships based in San Diego, California, had faced problems arising from the 200-mile decision since 1953. By 1969, more than 35 had been captured by the Peruvian navy and forced to pay "huge fines, sometimes as high as 15 thousand dollars." 43 The Mariner incident occurred shortly after the U.S.S. Pueblo was seized by North Korean forces and three days after Peru established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government's response was to cancel military sales to Peru, and the RGAF retaliated by expelling the U.S. military mission and rejecting the visit of U.S. Presidential Envoy Nelson Rockefeller, who had been sent by Richard Nixon to Latin America on a surveillance mission in 1969. 44 According to historian Darlene Rivas, the mission led by the then New York Governor lasted 20 days and was an unqualified failure. 45 In this context, it is not difficult to understand why the aggravation of the fishing conflict captured the attention of Congress and became the main issue of dispute with the RGAF. In 1968-1975, a considerable number of Congressmen attended the Senate and House plenary sessions to denounce the seizure of U.S. fishing vessels; criticize the State Department for its poor management of the problem, suggest the establishment of a retaliatory policy for addressing territorial issues, request naval protection for U.S. tuna ships, promote an international conference for resolving the conflict, and question the legality of the seizure of fishing vessels. They also presented and/or supported joint draft resolutions and/or amendments to revise U.S. territorial policy, cut economic aid to Peru, forbid fishing imports from countries interfering with U.S. vessels beyond 12 nautical miles from shore, recover ships loaned by the U.S. and used to intercept and capture U.S. shipping vessels, and expedite compensation to owners of U.S. fishing vessels for the fines paid upon being captured at sea (Table 1) . Among the 40-plus Congressmen attending the fishing debates, the most proactive was beyond doubt Representative Pelly (R-Washington). 46 It is important to stress that Pelly's interest in the matter did not begin with RGAF policies, as he had authored two draft amendments seeking to end the seizure of shipping vessels. The first one (1967) proposed discounting the fines levied on illegally seized U.S. vessels from U.S. economic aid to the capturing country. The second one, approved in 1968, suspended the sale of military equipment to countries capturing U.S. fishing vessels more than 12 miles off the coast. 47 In 1969-1971, Pelly developed an intense campaign in defense of U.S. fishing companies, in contrast with his sympathetic stance towards the IPC expropriation. 48 For example, on February 17, 1969, Pelly denounced the fact that the Peruvian navy had fired on one U.S. fishing vessel and captured another on,; and he requested President Nixon to provide secure naval protection. 49 On May 19 he also criticized the capture of another ship 25 miles off the coast of Peru. 50 Pelly went beyond denouncing these operations of the Peruvian navy. On April 24, 1969, he complained that the dispute about U.S. fishing vessels in international waters had been set aside by the Nixon administration to resolve the expropriation of a U.S. oil company, in clear reference to the IPC. The matter was serious, because if Peru or any other nation in the region captured another U.S. fishing vessel, a boycott on their goods could be imposed at U.S. ports. As proof, he presented a resolution approved by the biennial convention of the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, which criticized the illegal capture of ships, demanded immediate action by the U.S. government, and threatened to boycott shipments from countries harassing union members.
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On April 26, Pelly complained again that the fishing conflict had been abandoned in favor of the oil issue, and announced that he would press for legislation that "would cut off inputs of fish and fish products from these countries in the event of future seizures." 52 According to Pelly, his draft law did not seek to punish, but rather to force negotiation. Pelly was convinced that the economic impact of the measure would compel Peru and other Latin American nations to negotiate.
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One month later Pelly lashed back, criticizing the State Department for its management of Peruvian issues. He maintained that on February 1969, when the Peruvian navy opened fire on one fishing vessel and seized another one, the State Department should have notified the Peruvian government of the suspension of U.S. military sales. According to Pelly, the State Department abstained from doing so in order not to jeopardize the IPC negotiations, which came to nothing anyway. 54 Pelly was not the only Congressman concerned with ship captures. On March 4, 1969, Senator Joseph J. Mansfield (D-Texas) expressed his unease about the IPC expropriation and the ship seizures, which had created a confrontation within the U.S. Regarding the IPC, the Senator acknowledged that enforcing the Hickenlooper amendment was an option; but favored mediation by a third party like the OAS. As for the fishing issue, he indicated that some Congressmen demanded that Peru return the ships provided by the U.S. government and used to capture fishing vessels. 55 In both cases it was necessary to restrain from provocations and retaliations to avoid damaging relations with Latin America, as had occurred in the case of the U.S.-Cuba breakup.
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Peru's use of ships on loan from the U.S. to seize U.S. fishing vessels incensed many Congressmen. One of them was Louis C. Wyman (R-New Hampshire), who submitted a concurring resolution in May 1969 stating that some of the ships loaned to Peru must be returned. 57 man George Murphy (R-California) also addressed this subject, and linked it to U.S. economic aid to Peru. Reacting to the February 1969 incident, Murphy considered it necessary to send a strong message to Peru, Chile, and Ecuador: the U.S. would do everything in its power to protect its fishing vessels and put an end to harassment of them at sea. As these countries benefited from U.S. economic aid -and received ships on loan, which were later used to seize U.S. fishing vessels-the State Department had to decide whether to discontinue assistance to prevent such actions. 58 According to Representative Tim Lee Carter (R-Kentucky), 74 fishing vessels had been captured off the coasts of Chile, Peru, and Ecuador since 1961 (some of them by ships on loan from the U.S. Government), and. Among those countries, Peru itself had received 476 million dollars in U.S. economic aid. Carter concluded that U.S. taxpayers should not continue to provide assistance to a country like Peru, "which has no respect for the U.S."
59 During the debate on the draft of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Congressman John M. Ashbrook (R-Ohio) criticized the government for not having introduced any changes in the economic aid program to protect U.S. interests, as a result of which countries like Peru and Ecuador could seize fishing vessels while continuing to receive aid. Congressman Howard W. Pollock also opposed the bill since it considered the possibility of economic aid to countries like Peru and Ecuador that continued to capture ships illegally.
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Senator Robert P. Griffin (R-Michigan) and Congressmen Paul G. Rogers (D-Florida) and Edward (R-Alabama) emphasized the need to revise U.S. policy on maritime limits. Edward argued two points: first, the humiliation of U.S. fishing crews; and second, the fact that the coasts were under intense electronic surveillance by several communist countries. Rogers also criticized the abuses committed in international waters "under the guise of territorial sovereignty which extends seaward to unrealistic distances." He cited the capture of the shipping vessels San Juan and Cape Ann on March 19, 1969, 23 miles off the coast of Peru as an example. Both Congressmen favored a policy of territorial reciprocity: the U.S. should enforce the same territorial and fishing limits imposed by other countries. Rogers actually succeeded in introducing a joint resolution on this matter, which, in his view, would strengthen the Hickenlooper amendment and, therefore, the U.S. Government's negotiating position. 61 On March 24, 1969 , Senator Griffin submitted a resolution proposing a revision of U.S. territorial policy and an international conference to settle the matter. The resolution had the support of 25 Congressmen. As part of his presentation, Griffin denounced the capture of two tuna ships by the Peruvian navy. held back economic aid to Peru to force the Peruvian government to negotiate with the IPC. This strategy failed and provoked resentment among the Peruvian authorities. The supersonic aircraft affair aggravated discontent in Peru. 75 Church concluded by stating: "The story of U.S.-Peruvian relations in the last five years contains ample mistakes on both sides. The point is that each successive stage in the deterioration has been provoked, in one way or another, by some aspects of the U.S. aid program." 76 In both speeches, Church provides an excellent example of how liberal dissident Congressmen questioned U.S. foreign policy directly, as well as the role of the RGAF in the process. The Senator used Peru to propose an overhaul of U.S.-Latin America relations, starting with the termination of military aid and the use of economic aid as a tool for coercion. It was necessary to understand that the rise of Latin American nationalism was, in part, a reaction to a flawed foreign policy that fueled militarism.
Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. First, the "empire trap," as proposed by historian Noel Maurer, does not apply to the relation between Congress and the RGAF. Maurer maintains that, because of their power and influence, U.S. companies facing problems abroad -e.g., expropriations-always obtained government support, even at the cost of affecting U.S. geopolitical interests. In other words, domestic interests had again and again prevailed over strategic considerations. According to Maurer, direct or indirect intervention by the U.S. Government had historically been decisive for protecting U.S property abroad.
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Contrary to this position, the Congressmen analyzed in this study believed the capture of fishing vessels was a subject of greater relevance than the expropriation of a U.S. corporation. More Congressmen reacted in defense of fishing enterprises than in favor of the IPC. Moreover, they adopted harsher stances and did not show the least sympathy for Peru's territorial claims. Some of those who reacted against the capture of fishing vessels represented fishing states and were defending their voters; therefore, their actions were politically motivated. Others reacted from a nationalist standpoint, irritated by acts that they considered to be illegal and an affront to the U.S. The RGAF emerged in a particular period of congressional history marked by a rebellion led by Congressmen who were critical of U.S. foreign policy and, moreover, pressed for greater congressional participation in its design. They used the RGAF to advance their political and ideological agenda, criticizing the government's actions and policies.
Finally, when assessing U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to recall that the U.S. Government is not a monolithic entity, as demonstrated by the fact that Congress reacted differently from the Executive with respect to the reforms implemented by the RGAF. A close examination of such differences should lead to a better understanding of the evolution of U.S. foreign policy.
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